10 years of illusions by Smeets, J.B.J. & Brenner, E.
10 Years of Illusions
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A decade ago, S. Aglioti, J. F. X. DeSouza, and M. A. Goodale (1995) published an experiment that has
had a big influence on the way that visual information is thought to control human behavior. Their
findings have often been simplified as suggesting that action is immune to perceptual illusions. The
current authors critically analyze the 4 steps involved in this simplification and argue that research during
the last 10 years has shown that the validity of 3 of the 4 steps is doubtful. They conclude that this
experiment cannot be regarded as firm support for the 2-visual-systems hypothesis (i.e., that the ventral
stream is for perception and the dorsal stream is for visually guided actions).
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A decade ago, Aglioti, DeSouza, and Goodale (1995) published
an experiment that has had a big influence on the way that visual
information is thought to control human behavior. They presented
subjects with two disks on an Ebbinghaus figure: one surrounded
by large flankers and the other by small flankers. By asking the
subjects to pick up the largest (or smallest) disk, the authors
showed that the flankers had a larger effect on the choice of the
disk that was grasped than on the peak grip aperture of the
reach-to-grasp movement. This result has often been simplified as
indicating that action is immune to perceptual illusions, supporting
the two-visual-systems hypothesis that the ventral stream is for
perception and the dorsal stream for visually guided actions
(Goodale & Milner, 1992). This simplification involves four steps
of interpretation:
1. Choosing the target position is a perceptual (ventral)
process.
2. This process is clearly influenced by the illusion.
3. Peak grip aperture is a good measure of how size is
processed for action.
4. This measure is not affected by the illusion.
We argue that research during the last 10 years has shown that the
validity of three of these steps is doubtful.
Although frequently cited as showing that “the maximal open-
ing of a grasping hand is insensitive to the robust perceptual
illusion” (Goodale & Westwood, 2004, p. 205) or “grip aperture
completely resisted the illusion” (Goodale & Milner, 2004, p. 88),
Aglioti et al.’s (1995) study showed a clear effect on peak grip
aperture (see their Figure 5). All subsequent grasping experiments
that have used the Ebbinghaus illusion have also shown a larger
grip aperture for disks that look larger but are not (reviewed in
Table 1 of de Grave, Biegstraaten, Smeets, & Brenner, 2005). In
some cases, the effect was not significant (Amazeen & DaSilva,
2005; Haffenden & Goodale, 1998), whereas in others the effect
on peak grip aperture was equal to the perceptual effect (Franz,
Gegenfurtner, Bu¨lthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Pavani, Boscagli, Benve-
nuti, Rabuffetti, & Farne`, 1999). The last step is therefore not valid
for the original experiment and also not generally valid for later
replications.
The finding that in some situations the Ebbinghaus figure influ-
ences peak grip aperture as much as it does perception has been
used to argue that peak grip aperture and perception are based on
the same size information (Franz, 2001). Others claim that the lack
of correlation between peak grip aperture and perception shows
that these are based on two different size estimates (Amazeen &
DaSilva, 2005). However, such claims can be made only if one
agrees with the third step mentioned above: that peak grip aperture
is a good measure of how size is processed for grasping. Unfor-
tunately, there are good reasons to question this assumption. In-
formation about object size may not even be used to control
grasping at all (Smeets & Brenner, 1999). However, even if one
assumes that object size is used to control grip formation in
grasping, peak grip aperture can be considered to be a direct
measure for the effects of the Ebbinghaus illusion on action only
if the figure does not influence peak grip aperture in other ways. If
the flankers surrounding the center circle are, for instance, re-
garded as obstacles, they will influence peak grip aperture (Bieg-
straaten, Smeets, & Brenner, 2003; Mon-Williams, Tresilian, Cop-
pard, & Carson, 2001), which would explain why the separation
between flankers and target has a different effect on grasping than
on size estimation (Haffenden, Schiff, & Goodale, 2001; but see
Franz, Bu¨lthoff, & Fahle, 2003). The fact that the larger peak grip
aperture occurs earlier when grasping an object that appears to be
larger due to the Ebbinghaus illusion can be regarded as support
for the obstacle interpretation, because a larger peak grip aperture
occurs later for larger objects but earlier for objects that are more
difficult to grasp (Smeets, Glover, & Brenner, 2003). The finding
that rotating the positions of the flankers influences the orientation
of the hand when grasping also suggests that the flankers are
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regarded as obstacles (de Grave et al., 2005). The possibility that
flankers act as obstacles can be used to defend the claim of Aglioti
et al. (1995) from the direct criticism of Franz and colleagues
(Franz et al., 2000). However, this possibility leads to the unfor-
tunate conclusion that peak grip aperture is not a reliable measure
for determining how visual information is processed for grasping.
Thus, it cannot be used to support the claim that grip aperture is
based either on the perceived size (Franz et al., 2000) or on another
judgment of size (Aglioti et al., 1995) or on no judgment of size at
all (Brenner & Smeets, 1996). The third step in the interpretation
is therefore also not well founded.
The perceptual part of Aglioti et al.’s (1995) experiment has
received very little attention. Choosing a perceptual measure to
compare with grasping is not a simple issue (Franz, 2003). A very
clever feature of Aglioti et al.’s study was to incorporate the
perceptual judgment in the grasping task by letting the subjects
choose which of two possible targets to grasp, on the basis of their
size. Aglioti et al. thus implicitly claimed that selecting the target
is a perceptual (i.e., ventral) process. The question is whether this
claim (i.e., the first step of Aglioti et al.’s interpretation) is valid.
Some authors suggest that there might be independent selection
mechanisms for perception and action. For instance, Bonfiglioli,
Duncan, Rorden, and Kennett (2002) found that objects are not
more easily recognized at the location of the auditorily indicated
target for a goal-directed movement than at another location.
Furthermore, subjects who have to respond under time pressure
make more purely visual (nonsemantic) errors when choosing a
gesture (an action task) to indicate the object’s identity than when
making a conscious “perceptually based” response, such as object
naming (Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998). These differences between
choosing an action and preparing a perceptual response have been
explained by proposing that the dorsal pathway is responsible for
choosing an action but not for choosing a perceptual response. If
so, then choosing a target to grasp is not necessarily a (ventral)
perceptual process. However, other experimental evidence sug-
gests that the same mechanism is responsible for choosing a target
for action and for perception (Deubel, Schneider, & Paprotta,
1998; Schiegg, Deubel, & Schneider, 2003). Irrespective of
whether there is a single or more than one selection mechanism,
the important question for the two-visual-systems hypothesis is
whether the selection of a target for a goal-directed action is indeed
part of the ventral stream. If the selection occurs in the dorsal
stream or before the split of the two streams, the choice of the
target in the experiment by Aglioti et al. cannot be regarded as a
measure of the ventral processing of visual information for
perception.
Recent behavioral research not involving any visual illusions
provides compelling evidence for the involvement of the dorsal
stream in target selection. Desmurget and colleagues have pro-
vided a tool to determine behaviorally whether the dorsal stream is
critically involved in specific aspects of a task (Desmurget et al.,
1999; Pisella et al., 2000). Using transcranial magnetic stimulation
and a patient study, they showed that part of the dorsal route (the
posterior parietal cortex) is necessary for fast (less than 150-ms
latency) corrections of ongoing pointing movements to perturba-
tions of object locations. If the fast dorsal route is also responsible
for the selection of a target, subjects should be able to respond fast
to changes in target identity in an experiment in which the subject
has to choose the “correct” target location from two alternatives
(as in Aglioti et al., 1995). An experiment that we performed for
another purpose addressed this issue (Brenner & Smeets, 2004). In
the second session of that experiment, two squares appeared: a red
one and a green one. Subjects had to point to the red one as fast as
possible. As soon as the subject started to move, the luminance of
the two squares changed considerably. In some trials the red square
also became green at the same time (and vice versa). In these trials,
the other target became the correct one. Subjects were able to
adjust their choice to this change at a short (120-ms) latency.
Because such fast responses rely on the dorsal pathway, as men-
tioned above, selecting the correct target must take place in the
dorsal pathway, too, and is therefore presumably an integral part of
motor control and not a separate perceptual process. This even
holds for a choice based on color, an attribute that is irrelevant for
executing the pointing action. In the grasping experiment of Agli-
oti et al. (1995), target selection was based on size, according to
some a relevant attribute for grasping. It is therefore not at all
evident that target selection cannot be considered to be an integral
part of the action. Therefore, the first step of the interpretation is
also questionable.
Four steps are needed to interpret the results of Aglioti et al.
(1995) as showing that visual information is processed separately
for perception and action. From the discussion above, we can
conclude that 10 years of research have revealed that three of these
four steps are at least questionable. So, the results of the original
study do not warrant its conclusion. This does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that we should reject the two-visual-systems
hypothesis. It is even questionable whether such a rejection is
possible. If two tasks (one classified as perceptual and the other as
an action) are equally influenced by an illusion, one can argue that
this is because the illusion influences the visual processing before
the two streams are separated (Dyde & Milner, 2002). Another
frequently used argument that makes the hypothesis immune to
rejection is that the analyzed measure is not a real motor measure
but is influenced by perceptual contributions (Carey, 2001). The
effect of the Ebbinghaus illusion on movement time in a fast
pointing movement (van Donkelaar, 1999) and the effects of many
other illusions on various other aspects of motor tasks (reviewed in
Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, & Cuijpers, 2002) have therefore not
been regarded as enough evidence to reject the hypothesis.
One might think that a meta-analysis of all perception–action
studies involving illusions is a way to test the two-visual-systems
hypothesis. Although there are a few studies showing a larger
illusion effect on action than on perception (e.g., Yamagishi,
Anderson, & Ashida, 2001), the vast majority show a smaller
effect on action than on perception (reviewed by, for instance,
Carey, 2001; Goodale & Westwood, 2004; Smeets et al., 2002).
However, such a meta-analysis is biased for several reasons. The
strongest bias is caused by the fact that no one will regard a
stimulus that does not show any perceptual effect (but only a motor
effect) as an illusion. Elements of such a stimulus are regarded as
distractors (e.g., Fischer & Adam, 2001). The perceptual effect of
distractors is generally not formally tested but is considered to be
absent (otherwise it would have been an illusion). Second, when
setting up experiments to study the effect of illusions, one ensures
that the perceptual effect is as strong as possible (in order to be
able to get significant effects). For instance, because making the
central disk more similar to the flankers increases the strength of
the Ebbinghaus illusion, experimenters generally use thin chips in
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illusion experiments instead of the cylinders that are normally used
in grasping experiments (Franz et al., 2000). It is easy to design
perceptual experiments that are only marginally influenced by the
illusion (Vishton, Rea, Cutting, & Nunez, 1999), but experiment-
ers generally choose the task with the largest effect. This is
reasonable if one believes that there is a single common represen-
tation underlying all tasks. But if one assumes that each task uses
its own combination of (inconsistent) spatial attributes (Smeets et
al., 2002), this selection creates a bias.
In this article, we have concentrated on one paradigm used to
study a possible dissociation between perception and action: grasp-
ing the Ebbinghaus illusion. Although not reproduced as often,
other paradigms have also been used to test this dissociation. We
discuss two of them in the remainder of this article. Pointing (or
jabbing) at targets surrounded by an eccentric frame is a task that
was developed even before the use of the Ebbinghaus illusion in
grasping (Bridgeman, 1991; Bridgeman, Gemmer, Forsman, &
Huemer, 2000). The results for this illusion seemed unambiguous:
Despite the clear perceptual mislocalization of the target (the
induced Roelofs effect), the frame did not affect the endpoints of
fast goal-directed movements (jabbing). However, 10 years after
the initial publication, we questioned this interpretation (de Grave,
Brenner, & Smeets, 2002), because the effect of the illusion on
perceptual judgments of target location were not robust. In an
experiment designed to investigate whether all effects are caused
by the same shift in perceived “straight ahead,” we found that the
perceptual mislocalization disappeared in a session in which the
subjects could be asked to judge the frame location. Without
explicitly asking about the frame location, Bridgeman and col-
leagues concluded that both perceptual and motor effects could be
explained by the same shift in perceived straight ahead (Dasson-
ville, Bridgeman, Bala, Thiem, & Sampanes, 2004). Although
there is still some controversy about the correct interpretation in
terms of perceived straight ahead (Dassonville & Bala, 2004; de
Grave, Brenner, & Smeets, 2004), all recent articles on the induced
Roelofs effect agree that the results obtained with this paradigm
are fully compatible with a common processing for perception and
action.
Another interesting paradigm is the study of forces when lifting
an object. For lifting, you need a judgment of the object’s weight.
Such a judgment can be obtained visually by combining the
perceived size with an estimate of the object’s density. A well-
known illusion in which this judgment is fooled is the size–weight
illusion: When comparing the weights of two objects of identical
mass but different size, subjects perceive the larger one as being
lighter. Of course, the difference in size influences the forces
applied when lifting the object for the first time (as no veridical
information is available until the object is lifted). Of interest, the
size no longer affects the forces after the object has been lifted
repeatedly, although the perceptual illusion is not reduced by such
repetitions (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000). This shows that the lifting
force is not based on the same information as the perceptual
judgment of the object’s weight. The authors interpreted this as
support for separate processing of information for perception and
action.
Lifting forces have also been studied in combination with a
visual size illusion: the Ponzo illusion (Brenner & Smeets, 1996;
Jackson & Shaw, 2000). In these experiments, the illusion made
subjects lift an object with larger grip and lift forces when it
appeared larger. It has been argued that the effect of the illusion on
lifting does not eliminate the argument that visual processing for
action is immune to illusions because the forces during grasping
are “based on expectation” (Danckert, Sharif, Haffenden, Schiff, &
Goodale, 2002, p. 279) or because “inferred object properties such
as weight are vulnerable to perceptual illusions” (Dyde & Milner,
2002, p. 518). However, Flanagan and Beltzner’s (2000) study on
the size–weight illusion indicated that the forces that one applies to
lift an object are not inferred on the basis of conscious inferences
or expectations but are based on a direct sensorimotor prediction.
So it is very likely also that the effects of the Ponzo illusion on the
exerted forces are caused by a direct visuomotor prediction, rather
than indirectly through properties that are inferred from the per-
ceived size. If so, then the fact that the visual illusion affects lifting
forces is a clear violation of one aspect of the two-visual-systems
hypothesis: the presumed existence of a direct pathway for action
that is immune to illusions.
Most other illusion experiments that are claimed to support the
two-visual-systems hypothesis can also be interpreted as opposing
the hypothesis (reviewed by Smeets et al., 2002). The fact that the
results of some paradigms cannot be regarded as evidence for a
dissociation between visual processing for perception and action in
healthy subjects does not mean that there are not two visual
streams with different roles (Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko,
1983; Trevarthen, 1968) or that lesions to one of these streams will
not affect some perceptual tasks differently than some motor tasks
(Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991). However, even the
behavioral deficits of the patient on whom the two-visual-systems
hypothesis is based (D.F.) do not completely follow a dissociation
between perception and action but depend on whether egocentric
or allocentric information is required (Schenk, 2005). This recent
experimental result is in line with Smeets et al.’s (2002) earlier
claim that “whether an illusion influences the execution of a task
will therefore depend on which spatial attributes are used rather
than on whether the task is perceptual or motor” (p. 135).
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